Virginia Alexandria City Reckless Driving Intoxication Same Act Conviction Barred Lawyers Attorney

by

Atchuthan Sriskandarajah

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Krisjansons

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

August 23, 1996

Facts:

The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated and issued a summons for

speeding

. He posted a collateral on the speeding offense, paying a fine of $ 75.00 and costs. The speeding violation provisions of 10-3-875 of the City Code simply adopt the provisions of Code of Virginia, 46.2-875, that make the maximum speed limits in the City 35 miles an hour. Defendant argues that her speeding violation constitutes reckless driving under Code of Virginia, 46.2-862, which states that speeding 60 miles per hour where the maximum speed is 35 miles per hour constitutes reckless driving. Hence, she argues that her prosecution for driving while intoxicated is barred by Code of Virginia, 19.2-294.1, which prohibits conviction of both reckless driving and driving while intoxicated where both charges arise out of the same act or acts. The Commonwealth contended that the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty was simply a speeding offense for which a bond could be posted and not the reckless driving offense contemplated by Virginia

Issue:

Whether a person can be convicted of any offense constituting reckless driving and also driving while intoxicated where both charges arise out of the same act?

Discussion:

This court held that the statute in question, 19.2-294.1, is clear and unambiguous, and the legislative intent is clear. Under Article 7 of Title 46.2, there are fourteen different offenses that the legislature has determined constitute “reckless driving. . Nowhere in 19.2-294.1 does the legislature delineate, define, or limit in any way the “reckless driving” that constitutes a bar to a conviction for driving while intoxicated. Hence, this Court concludes, the legislature intended to include any offense constituting

reckless driving

under the Code. Since operation of a motor vehicle at the speed of 60 miles per hour where the maximum speed is 35 miles per hour constitutes reckless driving and since Defendant has been convicted of this offense and the charges grow out of the same act or acts, the conviction of Defendant of driving while intoxicated is barred by the provisions of 19.2-294.1.

Conclusion:

This court hence granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which it treated as a plea in bar.

Disclaimer:

These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm s unofficial views of the Justices opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content

Atchuthan Sriskandarajah is a Virginia lawyer and owner of the SRIS Law Group. The

SRIS Law Group

has offices in Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina & California. The firm handles criminal/

traffic defense

, family law, immigration & bankruptcy cases.

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